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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

A. B. CHRISTENSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Michael Lance Christenson,
Deceased
Plaintiff /Appellant
vs.
N. D. (PETE) HAYWARD, Sheriff
of Salt Lake County; ROGER F.
TAYLOR, Deputy Sheriff, Salt
Lake County; MICHAEL M. DAVIS,
Deputy Sheriff, Salt Lake
County; MICHAEL STEWART; BART
BARKER; TOM SHIMIZU, Board of
Commissioners, Salt Lake County

Case No. 19391

Defendants/Respondents

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE ACTION AND HOW IT AROSE
This is a claim for the wrongful death of Michael Lance
Christenson, the plaintiff's decedent, which resulted from the
defendants' failure to arrest Christenson and thereby prevent him
from riding his motorcycle while he was drunk.

As a result of the

defendants' failure to act, Christenson was fatally injured.

CH2-7

...

(ms)

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN THE LOWER COURT
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County on April 18, 1983.

The defen.

dants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendants' motion

was granted by the Honorable Dean E. Conder.
TYPE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff requests that the judgment of the lower court
be reversed, and that the case be remanded for trial.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On July 24, 1982, at approximately 1:30 a.m., sheriff's
deputies, Roger F. Taylor and Michael M. Davis, responded to a
call from the manager of the Billiards Palace, located at the
corner of 900 East and 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.

the

purpose of the call was to assist and restrain Michael Christenson,
plaintiff's decedent, who was extremely drunk and who had been
causing a disturbance.

The sheriff's deputies confronted Michael

Christenson in the parking iot of the Billiards Palace, conversec
with him and observed his behavior and, ultimately, told him to
walk his motorcycle away from that location.

The motorcycle was

a Honda CD-750, weighing approximately 530 pounds.

Both deputies

knew that Michael Christenson was so drunk that he was unable to

2
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drive his motorcycle without creating a danger to himself and
others.

Despite Christenson's obvious and apparent state of

intoxication, both deputies failed to arrest him;
they take any steps to impound the vehicle.

neither did

Michael Christenson

lived approximately two and one-half miles from the Billiards
Palace.

The bike weighed over 500 pounds, and it would take

a healthy and sober man between two and three hours to push the
bike that distance.

Several moments after talking with the

sheriff's deputies, Michael Christenson was driving his motorcycle and failed to negotiate a curve at approximately 400 East
and 4800 South, Salt Lake County, Utah, a distance of approximately 2.3 miles from the Billiards Palace.

As a result of the

accident, Christenson was transported to Cottonwood Hospital,
where he died on July 31, 1982.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
POLICE OFFICERS HAVE A DUTY TO EXERCISE THE CARE
AND CAUTION OF ORDINARY, REASONABLE AND PRUDENT
PERSONS.
The defendants' memorandum asks if "(it can) be logically maintained that officers who permitted the decedent to
"walk" or push his motorcycle could reasonably believe that
in so doing he would 'injure another person' ••• or himself?"
(Defendants' Memorandum, p. 4).

Certainly, it is reasonable to

3
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assume that a drunk would drive, and not walk, his motorcycle,
especially when he is required to walk the motorcycle over a
distance of two and one-half miles.

If it were reasonable to

assume that drunks would not drive, this State would not have
found it necessary to enact recent extensive and strict legislation on driving while intoxicated (Utah Code Annotated
Also, this country would be spared numerous traffic
deaths yearly resulting from the actions of drunk divers.

Police

officers, if anyone, should be aware of the erratic and unreasonable behavior of drunks.

Officers should be aware that a drunk

is quite likely to dive when he should stay from behind the wheel,
or off his motorcycle.
In failing to arrest the plaintiff's decedent, the
sheriff's deputies violated a duty imposed upon them by the statutes of this State:
General duties.

The sheriff shall:

1)

Preserve the peace.

2)

Make all lawful arrests.

Utah Code Annotated, 17-22-2(1)(2).

(1953).

The sheriff's deputies' intentional failure to arrest
the decedent

they were aware of both his drunken state and

of the probable likelihood that he would ride, rather than walk,
his motorcycle, was a negligent act.

4
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In the past, courts have held that statutory duties such
as those imposed by

Utah Code Annotated, are owed to

the general public and not to particular individuals.

The courts

have therefore denied individual claims based upon law officers'
failure to perform their statutory duty, unless a special relationship exists between the officer and the plaintiff, giving
rise to a specific duty owing to the plaintiff.
trend of the law.

This is not the

The trend in the law is that public employees

should be held liable for their tortious acts to the same extent
as private persons.
The State of Arizona has recently rejected the distinction between a general duty to the public and a specific duty to
an individual plaintiff in Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 97 (Ariz.
1982) :
"We shall no longer engage in the speculative
exercise of determining whether the tort-feasor
has a general duty to the injured party, which
spells no recovery, or if he had a specific
individual duty which means recovery. (Citation).
Thus, the parameters of duty owed by the State will
ordinarily be co-extensive with those owed by others."
at 599.
Alaska has also abandoned the general duty/specific duty
distinction in Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976).
"(W)e consider that the 'duty to all, duty to no-one'
doctrine is in reality a form of sovereign immunity,

5
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which is a matter dealt with by statute in Alaska,
and not to be amplified by court-created doctrine .
• • • Where there is no immunity, the state is to
be treated like a private litigant. To allow the
public duty doctrine to disturb this equality
would create immunity where the legislature has
not."
at 241-42.
Finally, a Massachusetts court, in Irwin v. Town of Ware,
Superior Court Department, Civil No. 17562, Hampshire County
Superior Court, Northampton, Massachusetts, attached as Appendix
A, found a town liable for injuries caused by a drunk driver.
The court ruled "as a matter of law ••• users of the highway are
a discreet class of people to whom the police may owe a duty,•
Irwin, p, 6.

In essence, the court's holding abolishes the

general duty to the public/special duty to the individual, at
least in respect to an officer's duty to enforce drunk driving
1aws.
Utah law has never decided this point specifically.

To

say that an officer is responsible only to the general public is
merely another way of saying that a person injured by a deputy
sheriff's negligence has no remedy against him.

Thus, a deputy

is under a general duty to the public to preserve the peace and
make all lawful arrests, yet there is no particular individual
who can enforce that duty,

Individuals injured by the negligent

acts of another should receive compensation for those injuries,
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regardless of whether or not the tort-feasor is a public
employee.
This case should still go to trial even if the court
determines that the plaintiff must show that the deputies owed
a special duty to Michael Chrisenson before recovery will be
allowed.

The complaint and the summary judgment memorandum

allege facts sufficient to support the finding of such a special
duty.
The defendants' memorandum, Point One, relies upon the
case of Shore v. Town of Stonington, 444 A.2d 1379 (Conn. 1982),
where a showing of a clear and unequivocal duty to a particular
individual was required for a cause in action in negligence to
be shown.

In Shore, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that

although a drunk driver had been stopped, but not arrested, by
a town police officer, the plaintiff had no cause in action for
negligence against the officer and the town for failure to
enforce motor vehicle laws governing driving while under the
influence.

The court noted three exceptions to its ruling.

first exception is as follows:
"We have recognized the existence of such a duty
in sitations where it would be apparent to the
public officer that his failure to act would be
likely to subject an identifiable person to
imminent harm."
Shore at 1382.

7
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In Shore, the plaintiff's decedent was a third party

viho

was unknown to the officer when he stopped the drunk driver.
After the officer released the driver, he (the driver) struck and
killed plaintiff's decedent.

In the present case, the deputies

had immediate contact with plaintiff's decedent.

They could have

reasonably foreseen that if not restrained or arrested, he
would propbably ride his motorcycle and be subject to imminent
harm.
In Tompkins v. Kenner Police De_Q_artme.B_!., 402 S.2d 276
(La. 1981), the Court of Appeals of Louisiana proposed the
following rule to determine if an officer had a duty to a particlar individual:
• • • • (I)n enforcement of a governmental regulation which, through closeness in proximity or
time, results in a one-to-one relationship between
the police officer and the injured party, the police
officer ceases to act only for the public good and
at that moment becomes obligated to the individual
to conduct himself in such a way as not to cause
him unnecessary injury.•
Tompkins at 280.
In Tompkins, a police officer failed to discover the
plaintiff's decedent while investigating an automobile accident,
even though the officer had been informed that the decedent was
still alive three hours later, but, because of the lapse of time,
he died later of loss of blood.

The court found that the officer

was negligently liable for the decedent's death.
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In Tompkins, the officer never saw the decedent, but
was still held liable for his death.

In the present case, the

plaintiff decedent, Michael Christenson, was in much closer proximity to the deputies.
Christenson.

The deputies both saw and talked with

They were aware of his drunken state and the possi-

bility that he might come to harm if they did not arrest him.
Certainly, if the officer in Tompkins owed a duty to the plaintiff decedent, the deputies Taylor and Davis owed a duty to to
Michael Christenson.

The deputies failed to measure up to that

duty.
It might be argued that deputies Taylor and Davis had no
affirmative duty to intervene and remedy a situation involving an·
obviously intoxicated and unruly Christenson.
ties understood this duty

However, the depu-

they momentarily detained Christ-

enson and ascertained that he was drunk and likely to harm himself or another.

Justice Cardozo stated this principle in Mach

Co. v. Rensselar Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 892 (1928).
"What we need to know is the conduct that engenders
the relation. It is here that the formula, however
incomplete, has its value and significance. If
conduct has gone forward to such a stage that
inaction would commonly result, not negatively
merely in withholding a benefit, but positively
or actively in working an injury, there exists
a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward." (Citation).
Mach at 898.
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Nor is it sufficient that the deputies left Christenson
in a condition no worse than when they found him.

The deputies,

having assumed a duty towards Christenson, were required to take
protective action against any reasonably foreseeable injury to
the decedent.
"The
duty
tive
must

case law is clear that even when no original
is owed to the paintiff to undertake affirmaaction, once it is voluntarily undertaken, it
be performed with due care •

. • • (T)his duty cannot be fulfilled by placing
the helpless person in position of peril equal to
that from which he was rescued."
Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d, 553, 559,
362 N.E.2d 960, 964-65; 3294 N.Y.S.2d 161, 165,
( 1977).
Deputies Taylor and Davis had intervened when Christenson
was drunk on the night of July 24, 1982, and could have exercised
immediate physical control over him.
duty;

Such was their statutory

instead, the deputies relinquished control over the

decedent after instructing him to "walk" his motorcycle home.

As

a consequence, Michael Christenson was killed in a single vehicle
accident.

Of course, Christenson might have died in the same

accident even if the officers had not intervened;
is beside the point.

this, however,

As noted in Parvi, once the deputies inter·

vened, it became their obligation to improve the decedent's
position and not to let happen what may happen, when they failed
to detain Michael Christenson.

Certainly, under the above

10

authority, it is not possible to say that Deputies Taylor and
Davis did not owe a clear duty to the plaintiff's decedent.
Utah law has tended to impose liability on individual
public employees for mmisfeasance and malfeasance.

In

h_Jl_,__B.Q_b_i._I]_?.£!!., 14 Utah .2d 6, 376 P.2d 388 (1962), a drunk
escaped the custody of an arresting officer while being booked.
The drunk fell down the stairs, hitting his head on a cement
floor.

He died three days later from head injuries.

The defen-

dant officer argued that he was liable to the plaintiff only if
he was guilty of "wrongful" conduct, and not merely guilty of
negligence.

The Utah Supreme Court found that officers' duty

extended beyond avoiding "wrongful" conduct:
"It is also argued that it was the deceased's
fault in getting himself into what witnesses
classified as a 'very drunken condition', thus
initiating the chain of events which culminated
in his tragic death, and that the defendant was
not bound to protect him from his own folly.
This assertion is not entirely without plausibility. Ordinarily one has no duty to look
after the safety of another who has become
voluntarily intoxicated and thus limited his
ability to protect himself. But that absence
of duty ended when Officer Robinson took Benally into custody. It then became his obligation to measure up to the standard of conduct
which the law almost universally imposes: that
of using the degree of care and caution which
an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person
would use under the circmstances. The deceased
was entitled to have that degree of care
observed in his behalf, even though he was
drunk. As is sometimes said 'a drunk man is
as much entitled to a safe sidewalk as a sober
one, ard is a great deal more in need of
Bena lJ.J.. at 390.
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In

the plaintiff's decedent was under the

defendant officer's care and control.

In the present case,

Michael Christenson was under the defendant deputies' care and
control.

They could foresee that Christenson would attempt to

ride his motorcycle and sustain serious injuries.

The deputies'

duty extended beyond refraining from unlawful acts of excessive
violence.

The deputies had a duty as reasonable and prudent per-

sons to take steps to avoid decedent's death.
ruled:

The Benally court

"Accordingly, it was error for the court • • • to refuse

to instruct upon (the officer's) duty to exercise reasonable care
for (the deceased' s) safety."

Bena 11..Y... at 390.

Whether Deputies Taylor and Davis "undertook" to assist
and restrain the plaintiff's decedent
jury.

is a question for the

If the deputies did undertake to assist the decedent,

their actions gave rise to a duty towards him.

Whether the depu-

ties failed in that duty is a question for the jury.

The fore-

seeability of the decedent's injuries is also a question for the
jury.
If the existence of the deputies' duty is a matter of
law, that law is not yet decided in Utah.

Since lg63, Arizona

has held both officers and their employees liable for the
officer's negligent acts.

Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm.,

93 Ariz. 384, P.2d 107 (1963):

12
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"{T)he substantive defense of governmental
immunity is now abolished not only for the
instant case, but for all other pending cases,
those not yet filed which are not barred by
the Statute of Limitations and all future
causes of action. All previous decisions to
the contrary are overruled.
There is perhaps no doctrine more firmly
established that the principal that liability
follows tortious wrongdoing; that where
negligence is the proximate cause of injury,
the rule is liability and immunity is the
exception • • "
at 112.
POINT II·
PLAINTIFF'S DECEDENT COULD NOT, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, HAVE "ASSUMED THE RISK."
In Utah, the law on assumption of risk contains two
elements.

There must be knowledge of a danger and a free and

voluntary consent to assume it.

Meese v. Brigham Young

University, Ut., 639 P.2d 720.
"This court has ruled that the essential elements
of assumption of risk are (1) knowledge of a
danger, and (2) a free and voluntary consent to
assume it. It must be actual knowledge and it is
not sufficient to say that in the exercise of
ordinary care one would know that danger exists."
Meese at 724.
Of course, the plaintiff's decedent should have known
about the danger inherent in riding his motorcycle while drunk,
but how could the decedent have given free and voluntary consent
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to assume the risk while he was intoxicated?

The decedent's

judgment was severely impaired by his drunkenness, while the
deputies were sober and possessed unimpaired judgment.

Whether

the officers were able to appreciate the risk of injury more
clearly than the decedent is a question for the jury:
"We thus hold that under our comparative
negligence statute "Assumption of risk"
language is not appropriate to describe the
various concepts previously dealt with under
that terminology but is to be treated, in its
secondary sense, as contributory negligence.
Specifically, and with particular reference to
our comparative negligence act, the reasonableness of plaintiff's conduct in confronting a
known or unknown risk created by defendant's
negligence will basically be determined under
principles of contributory negligence.
Attention should be focused on whether a
reasonably prudent man, in the exercise of
due care, would have incurred the risk,
despite his knowledge of it and, if so,
whether he would have conducted himself in
the manner in which the plaintiff acted in
light of all the surrounding circmstances,
including the appreciated risk • • • Then, if
plaintiff's unreasonableness is viewed to be
less than that of defendant, according to the
terms of the statute, "Any damages allowed
shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the
person recovering." Jacobsen Construction
Co., Inc. et a1 v. Structo-Lite Engineering,
Inc., 619 P.za 306 (Utah 19wr.It might be argued that the decedent's vo 1untary drunken·
ness is an intervening act, relieving the defendants of liability;
however, a reasonably foreseeable intervening act would not
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supersede the defendants' original negligence, nor must the
defendants' negligence be the sole cause of the decedent's death.
The Court of Appeelc nf

York has said that a drunken plain-

tiff's actions are foreseeable and should not excuse a
defendant's negligence.

Parvi v. City of KinJ!.ston, 41 N.Y.2d

553, 362 N.E.2d 960, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1977):
"Finally, a word of clarification may be in
order as to the legal role of plaintiff's
voluntary intoxication. To accept the
defendant's argent, that the intoxication was
itself the proximate causea of Parvi's injury
as a matter of law, would be to negate the
very duty imposed on the police officers when
they took Parvi and Dugan into custody. It
would be to march up the hill only to march
down again. The clear duty imposed on the
officers interdicts such a result if, as the
jury may find, their conduct was unreasonable.
(Cit at i ans). For it is the very fact of
plaintiff's drunkenness which precipitated
duty once the officers made the decision to
act."
In the present case, the decedent's drunkenness precipitated the deputies' decision to act.
was observed by the deputies.

The decedent's drunkenness

Their experience should have told

them that the decedent was likely to ride instead of "walk" his
motorcycle, as they directed him to do.

Whether the deputies

could have reasonably foreseen that the decedent might be injured
or killed if he did ride his motorcycle is a question of fact.
lf the deputies were unaware of the decedent's drunkenness, or if

he became drunk after the deputies encountered him, then the
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decedent's actions might be an intervening cause sufficient, as
a matter of law, to relieve the deputies of liability.
is not the case;

But this

here, the deputies, aware of the decedent's

intoxicated state, took the risk that the decedent would obey
their command.

If the deputies were negligent in taking the

risk, then the jury should decide if the consequences of that
negligence were foreseeable.
The existence of the deputies' duty is a question of law
which has not been decided in Utah.

The present trend in other

jurisdictions is to find that such a duty exists.

The plaintiff

has alleged sufficient facts to show the existence of this duty,
even if the court finds that there must be a special relationship
between the deputies and the decedent.

The foreseeability of

the decedent's death, the reasonableness of the deputies' conduct
and their ability to appreciate the risk, as compared to the
decedent's ability, are questions of fact for the jury.

The

granting of summary judgment for the defendants should be
reversed and the case remanded for trial.
submitted,
WALTER R. ELLETT
for Plaintiff
Hand delivered copy of the foregoing to L. E. Midgley, Deputy
County Attorney, Attorney for Defendants, 231 East 400 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
day of April 1984.

, IL.)

,'/C·

L

•

•

.:_

Cl 1 l(f-:.\L\;;I·,

I

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Hampshire, ss.

-·------

·-·
Superior
Court
Civil Action
No. 17562

DEBBIE IRWIN, et al
Plaintiffs
vs.

RULINGS AND REPORT

OF WARE, MASSACHUSETTS
Defendant

The plaintiff, Debbie L. Irwin, brought this action against
defendant Tovm of Ware on behalf of herself, the estate of her
deceased husband

D. Irwin and deceased daughter Misty Jane

Irwin, and as next friend of her son Steven Irwin.

TI1e plaintiffs

charged that police officers of Ware negligently failed to take
a driver who was under the influence of intoxicating liquor into
protective custody, resulting in an accident which caused the
injuries described below.

The jury returned special verdicts for

the plaintiffs in the amount of $873,690.

Defendant brought these

motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, to reduce the jury's award, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. SO(b)
or 59 (e).

Based on the evidence presented, the jury could have found
the following facts.
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on Sunday, May 11., 1978, an on-duty
Appendix A

officer of the Ware Police Department stopped an automobile
by Donald B. fuller.

This officer was joined by another officer,

and as a result of their questioning of Fuller, the officers

li

or should have known him to be under the influence of alcohol.

Instead of taking Fuller into protective custody, the officer:
warned hir.1 to drive carefully and allowed him to continue on.

Not

more than ten (10) r:iinutes later, Fuller's vehicle collided with a
vehicle operated by Mark Irwin in which his wife and children were
passengers.

The Irwins' vehicle was

northbound;

automobile was going southbound in the northbound lane.

Fuller

As a resu'.:

of the ensuing head-on collision, Mark and Hisey Jane were killed
while Debbie and Steven were severely injured. Fuller too was kille.
The jury found that the defendant breached a duty which it owe:
to the plaintiffs, and that such breach proximately caused plaintiffs' injuries.

The jury assessed damages of $873,697 as follo11S:

$471,348.50 to the estate of Hark Irwin; $1348.50 to Misty Jane
Irwin's estate; $196,000 to Steven Irwin, and $205,000 to Debbie L.
Irwin.
The Law
The defendant has maintained throughout that (1) the acts of
Ware's police officer employees were discretionary, and therefore
the town is not liable under G. L. c. 258; (2) the town, through its

1/ Fuller

told the officers that he had been drinking alcohol.
Scientific evidence subsequently established Fuller's blood
.
content to have been 202 mg alcohol per 100 ml blood, or approxi·
mately twenty one-hundredths alcohol/blood. Under G.L. c.90,
§24(e), an alcohol content of ten one-hundredths creates a presumption of intoxication
")..
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police officers, owed no duty to the Irwins who therefore are
precluded from recovering under any negligence theory; and (3)
in any event, the plaintiffs' recovery is limited by G.L. c.258,
§2 to $100, 000.

These arguments will be considered separately.

(1) The liability of the Town of Ware for acts of its police
officer enployees.
Defendant argues it is not liable for the acts of its employee
police officers in allowing Fuller to continue to operate his
vehicle as such acts were discretionary

than ministerial,

and therefore are exempted from G.L. c.258, §2 by G.L. c.258, §lO(b).
G.L. c.258 §lO(b) provides that no liability attaches to a
municipality for the negligent performance of a discretionary duty
by its enployees.

Ware claims that the officers' decision to

allow Fuller to proceed to operate his vehicle was the exercise of
a discretionary function.
In Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208 (1979), the Supreme
Judicial Court con.sidered what types of public functions might be
considered "discretionary" and which functions would be considered
"ministerial," giving rise to liability for negligence.

TI1e Whi tneY

court noted:
... when the particular conduct claimed to be
tortious involves ... the carrying out of previously established policies or plans, such
acts should be governed by the established
standards of tort liability .•.• (emphasis added]
373 Mass. at 218.
That''carnage caused by drunk drivers" on our highways has
reached catastrophic proportions cannot be seriously disputed.
See South Dakota v. Neville, 51 U.S.L.W. 4148, 4150 (Feb. 22, 1983).
The removal from our highways of persons under the influence of
-3-

alcohol is a well-established policy in Mass2chusetts.

)(
. \

See

v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323 (l982) and cases cited.

ffnile

the officers may not have been under a duty to stop Fuller's car
(this determination would require a finding of fact not made in
the present action), once they decided to stop the vehicle, their
obligation to appropriately investigate the driver's intoxication,
under the facts of this case, was no longer a matter of discretion.
The jury was presented with aI:1ple evidence upon which to base
finding that the officers negligently
in detaining Fuller.

a·

to take proper action

Where the officers stopped Fuller's car

because it was proceeding erratically, they knew of the likelihood
that Fuller was departing

a tavern at closing time, and Fuller

told the officers he had been drinking, the officers' obligation
to ensure the safety of the highways by investigating Fuller's
intoxication was no longer discretionary.

I rule as a matter of

law that the officers' decision not to take Fuller into protective
custody or at least further investigate his potential intoxication
was the violation of a ministerial obligation, and therefore
plaintiffs' action is not barred by the operation of G.L. c.258,
§10 (b).

(2) The duty of the Town of Ware, through its police officers,
to the Irwins.
The defendant suggests that even if the officers negligently
violated their duty, such a duty was to the public at large and
not to the Irwins, and therefore no recovery should be allowed in
this case.
Defendant relies on Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 802 (1982) ·
a case in which the Supreme Judicial Court found a town's building
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inspector owed no duty to the purchasers of a home.

The home

had been negligently constructed in violation of the to>m's building code.

In that case it was found that the building inspector

!:new or should have known of the failure to comply with conditions
of the building permit, but that he nevertheless issued an occupancy permit.
The defendant urges that Dinsky precludes the finding of a
duty to any particular plaintiff when a general duty is owed to
the public at large.

That argument is not persuasive for two reasons.

First, Dinsky and the cases cited therein deal with the issuance of building permits.

The building inspector was performing a

general service and the potential buyers were not forced to operate
in reliance on the inspector.

They could have performed or secured

their own building inspection before entering into a purchase
agreement.
Users of the highways, however, operate in reliance on the
government to maintain the safety of the roads.

While the police

are not insurers of public safety, the function they perform cannot be duplicated or secured through any amount of private effort.
Accordingly, while the Dinsky court found a duty to the general
public precluded relief to any specific group, the duty of the
police in the instant case is not to the general public.
it is to a specific class:

Rather,

highway users.

Second, the defendant's position that there can be no liability
by

a I:lunicipality when a duty is owed to the public is inconsistent

with the finding of the Supreme Judicial Court in Slaven v.
386 Mass. 885 (1982),a case decided after Dinsky.

In Slaven the

court left open the question of whether a town's employee (a jailer)

-s-
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owed a duty to a prisoner to tal;e reasonable measures to prevent
the prisoner from hanging himself in his cell with his belt.
Instead the court found the jailer had no knowledge or reason to
know of the inmate's suicidal tendencies.

The holding in Slaven

undermines the defendant's arguments that no "public" duty can be
owed to a particular class.
The court rules as a t:latter of law that users of the highway
are a discreet class of people to whom the police rnay owe a duty.
For that reason the Dins1:y rule has no application to the instant
2/
case. (3) The $100,000 limit to recovery imoosed by G.L. c.258, §2.
Defendant contends that under G.L. c.258, §2 the maximum amount
for which it can be found liable is $100,000.

Plaintiffs argue

that the jury verdict of $873, 697 should remain intact.

While no

Massachusetts appellate court has yet interpreted the meaning of
the limitation clause of G.L. c.258, §2, the statute can be interpreted in various ways with different results.
There are at least four potential analyses of §2:

(1) that

it does not apply at all to the facts of this case; (2) that the
$100,000 limitation applies to each cause of action;
limitation applies to each individual plaintiff;

(3) that the

or (4) that the

limitation applies to all plaintiffs collectively for injuries
sustained in the same "incident."
The parties have not supplied, nor has the court been able to
no Hassachusetts cases of record appear to have considered
whether a public duty exists as to users of the highway, other
states have found highway users to be a distinct class to whoo
the duty may run. See Oles::ezuk v. State of Arizona, 604 P 2d
639 (1979); Green v. Livermor-e;-117 Cal. App. 3d 82 (1981).

di;co·Jer, any significan:: amount of legislative history demonstrat·""[ the inte:-it of the lawrnal:ers in establishing the $100,000 limitation. }_/ Nevertheless the court is of the opinion that G.L. c.258,
§2 does apply to the facts of this case.

In particular, I reject

plaintiffs' notion that the effect of G.L. c.229 is to repeal c.258,
\2 in wroneful death actions.

Section two of G.L. c.258 specifically

includes "injury or death caused by the wrongful act or omission
of any public employee .... "
I also reject plaintiffs'

that the $100,000 limit

applies to each separate cause of action.

"Causes of action" are

arbitrary legal terms which may or may not be relevant for the
purposes of awarding damages.

To allow such terms to be measure-

ments of dar.iage would elevate fore over substance.
\,'hile the legislators apparently chose not to pass a 1979
bill lirr:iting recovery to "$100,000 per individual or $300,000 per
incident," Glannon, fn. 128, p. 18, the bill as it was enacted
does not clarify whether the limitation of $100,000 applies per
individual or per incident.

Accordingly, while I am inclined to

agree with Professor Glannon that "[t]he legislature probably
intended to limit each claimant's recovery to one hundred thousand
dollars" (emphasis added), I am reporting this aspect of the case
for determir.ation by an appellate court.
laH review article, "Governmental Tort Liability under the
llassachusetts Tort Claims Act of 197G," by Joseph W. Glam;on,
Mass. Law. R. 7
(1981). does refer in passing to the legislative
history of the limitation clause. See fn. 128. at 18.
':../I note that on a per person basis plaintiffs' total recovery would
be $301,348.50, as follows: $100,000 each for Debbie Irwin, Steven
Irwin. and the estate of Mark Irwin; $1348. 50 for the estate of
Misty Jane Irwin.
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Accordingly, I rule that defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict be denied; and that the motion for
reduction of damages be reported to the Appeals Court pursuant
5/
to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 and Mass. R. App. P. 5. -

Entered:

2./Pursuant to Hass. R. App. P. 5, I designate the defendant Town
of Ware as the aggrieved party.
-8-

